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Abstract: This Article argues that the "going concern value" standard
adopted by the Delaware courts as the measure of "fair value" in share
valuation proceedings is superior, in both fairness and efficiency, to its two
main competitors, market value and third-party sale value. That superior-
ity, however, depends upon two propositions. First, going concern value
must be measured in a way that includes not only the present value of the
corporation's existing assets, but also the present value of the reinvestment
opportunities available to and anticipated by the firm at the time of
merger. Second, going concern value should not include the value of cor-
porate control where the merger creates control through the aggregation
of previously dispersed shares. In that case, the benefits created by the ag-
gregation of shares belong to the party that created the increased value.
Where a pre-existing, controlling shareholder squeezes out the minority,
however, the minority shareholders are especially vulnerable to an acquisi-
tion at a price that fails to reflect the firm's going concern value. Where
such a controller fails to present a valid discounted cash flow analysis, it
deprives the minority shareholders and the court of access to projections
of future free cash flows of the firm. In this situation, the courts should
adopt a penalty default presumption that fair value includes the value of
control as reflected in comparable company acquisitions. This presump-
tion comports with common law doctrines of fiduciary duty and the entire
fairness standard, as well as adverse evidentiary inferences drawn from
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failure to produce relevant evidence. The controller, as faithful fiduciary,
can avoid the proposed presumption by preparing and submitting to judi-
cial scrutiny a valid, discounted cash flow analysis. The opportunistic con-
troller, on the other hand, is subjected to a fair value determination that
amounts to third-party sale value minus synergies.
INTRODUCTION
This Article presents a normative analysis of the principal alterna-
tive valuation standards—market value, third-party sale value, and go-
ing concern value—that might be used to provide dissenting share-
holders with fair value for their shares in a cash-out transaction.' Two
countervailing considerations frame this analysis. First, an inappropri-
ately now valuation standard will encourage opportunism by bidders
who can engage in value-decreasing transactions because the valuation
standard allows them to pay less than the value of the shares being ac-
quired. Second, and conversely, an inappropriately high standard will
discourage value-enhancing transactions in which the shares of non-
consenting shareholders are acquired. We' argue that, of the three
principal alternative valuation standards, the going concern value stan-
dard best balances these two considerations, has the fewest perverse
incentive effects, and is most workable in the types of cases where the
appraisal remedy is available. 2
 As a consequence, we agree with the
Delaware courts' consistent holding that the statutory requirement of
fair value is best measured by going concern value. 3
hi advocating in favor of the going concern value standard we
stress the importance of correct measurement. 4
 Here again, we agree
with the Delaware courts that the discounted value of the corporation's
free cash flow is the appropriate measure of going concern values We
stress, however, that going concern value must include not only the dis-
counted free cash flow ("DCF") to be generated by the corporation's
current assets, but also the discounted free cash flow to be generated by
the reinvestment opportunities anticipated by the corporation at the
time of the squeeze-out transaction. 6
 This is especially important in
I See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
a Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Dela-
ware Appraisal Law, 311 CORP. L. 119, 137-38 (2005) (showing the necessity of including
the present value of the firm's growth opportunities when calculating going concern
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cases of a going-private transaction initiated by an existing controller,
where neither synergies nor elimination of agency costs is ordinarily an
economic justification for the transaction.? In such situations, judicial
attention to the potential for misappropriation of reinvestment oppor-
tunities serves as an important check on opportunism by controlling
shareholders.8
Despite the consensus surrounding the appropriate use of dis-
counted free cash flow analysis to determine "fair value," there are lin-
gering doubts about what the going concern value standard actually
means in the context of other valuation approaches, particularly com-
parable company analysis. 9
 Where a valuation relies on ratios of share
prices of comparable companies, for example, there is considerable
controversy about whether, and to what extent, to give effect to a meas-
ure of fair value that relies on the value of the firm in a . sale to a third
party. 1 °
According to one view, gC•ing concern value inevitably requires
some consideration of third-party sale value. 11
 An underlying assump-
tion is that going concern value necessarily exceeds the trading value of
shares because (a) companies are invariably sold at premiums to mar-
ket, (b) synergies do not account for all—or even very much—of those
premiums, and therefore (c) going concerns must be worth more than
their aggregate share market capitalization." Under this view, then, any
valuation standard that relies on trading prices must understate "fair
value" or going concern value, and an upward adjustment is necessary
to compensate for this perceived "implicit minority discount." 8
We suggest that the foregoing syllogism contains a faulty premise:
namely, that corporate control
—a key component of acquisition pre-
miums—inherently belongs to the enterprise itself and must be
deemed part of going concern value and the "fair value" of dissenting
shares. 14
 We disagree with this view of corporate control. 15 Control
value does not exist in a corporation owned by a fluid, disaggregated
value). Although we use the conventional abbreviation, "DCF," we believe the term "dis-
counted free cash flow" more accurately describes the valuation technique in question.
7
 See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
13
 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
04 See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
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mass of shareholders. 16
 Rather, it is created by the aggregation of
shares. 17
 Such aggregation of shares entails a reduction in agency costs,
resulting in the creation of value that fairly belongs to the entity aggre-
gating the shares. 16
 We therefore continue to urge that a routine up-
ward adjustment of the results of comparable company analyses, relying
on the premise that share market prices reflect an inherent or implicit
minority discount, is inappropriate as a matter of both finance and
fairness. 19
With these considerations in mind, and in place of the implicit
minority discount, we propose that in the case of a squeeze-out merger
by a controlling shareholder, and in the absence of reliable DCF analy-
sis, the courts can appropriately continue to estimate going concern
value by reference to acquisition prices of comparable companies, mi-
nus some estimate of synergies included in such deal prices." Our ra-
tionale turns on an analysis of the benefits of control and, in particular,
whether those benefits belong to the corporation or to the minority
shareholders in a squeeze-out merger. 21 We argue that where a corpora-
tion had been owned by a fluid aggregation of shareholders, the bene-
fits of control belong to the controller who aggregates the shares. 22
Where control is already concentrated, however, the benefits associated
with such control should be reflected in the minority shareholders'
proportionate share of the value of the enterprise. 23
Consequently; this Article proposes a method for determining fair
value in a class of cases in which the appraisal remedy plays a particu-
larly significant role—squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders. In our
view, this proposed method shows that, despite the erroneous implicit
minority discount assumption, the Delaware courts have in fact arrived
at the proper valuation results. 24
 Specifically, we show that the implicit
16 The Supreme Court of Delaware has formulated the concept as the "fluid aggrega-
tion of unaffiliated stockholders." See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34,43 (Del. 1994). That formulation drew upon Chancellor Allen's 1989 statement
that "control of the corporation existed in a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders
representing a voting majority—in other words, in the market." Paramount Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., No. 10866,1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *64-65 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989).
17 See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
to See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
19 See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh Sc Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling
Life of the "Implicit Minority Discount" in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2007).
21) See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 155-177 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 200-226 and accompanying text.
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minority discount has been used exclusively in cases where going con-
cern value is approximated, not by discounted cash flow methodology,
but by comparable company analysis." This is the setting where the po-
tential for opportunism is the highest and where the Delaware courts
have long identified the need for heightened scrutiny. 26
 One important
concern in this setting arises where the absence of reliable DCF projec-
tions and analysis by the respondent requires the parties, experts, and
the courts to substitute comparable company analysis for DCF method-
ology. 27 In that situation, the respondent's own failure to develop such
projections and analysis enables it to avoid judicial scrutiny that might
reveal future returns on existing assets or reinvestment opportunities in
which all shareholders would, but for the merger, be entitled to share."
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, focusing on Delaware
law, we examine the legal setting in whiCh the courts define standards
for valuing corporate shares. 29 In Part II, we first review in detail the
alternative standards for determining the fair value of shares, examin-
ing their analytical premises and normative merits." Based on this
analysis, we then recommend that the going concern value standard is
the appropriate standard for determining the fair value of shares. In
Part HI, we examine the controversy in Delaware case law in applying
the going concern standard, focusing on the critical role played by the
benefits of control." In Part IV, we apply the conclusions previously
developed and suggest a framework for judicial treatment of valuation
issues that emphasizes use of DCF analysis but suggests standards for
applying comparable company analysis as an alternative measure of
going concern value. 32
25 See, e.g.. Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc„ No. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at
*65 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., No. 19211,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *17 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2004); Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v.
Coleman Co., No. 17802, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *84-85 (Del. Ch. Sep. 8, 2004);
Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am. Inc., No. 12207-NC, 2004 Del Ch. LEXIS 108, at
*129 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004); Daft & Co. v. Travelocity.com , Inc., No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 75, at *45-46 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004); Borruso v. Commc'ns Telesys. WI, 753 &2d
451, 459 (Del. Ch. 1999); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 75, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995); Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., No. 11265, 1992
Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992).
26 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 178-226 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 178-226 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 63-125 and accompanying text.
31
 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 179-226 and accompanying text.




The legal prescription in Delaware for determining share value in
compulsory share buyouts derives from the appraisal rights statute, sec-
tion 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 33 Subsection (h) of
that statute sets forth the relevant parameters for determining value,
stating that in appraisal proceedings the Court of Chancery
shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expecta-
tion of the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if
any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair
value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into
account all relevant factors . . 54
This statutory formulation contains two important instructions
that are relevant to the subject at hand: first, shareholders who object
and appropriately dissent from a merger are entitled to an award of
their shares' "fair value"—a term that the statute does not further de-
fine; and second, "fair value," whatever it does mean, does not include
any "element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation
of the merger or consolidation."35 We next examine these two instruc-
tions in more detail.
"Fair value" is a legal term, the substantive content of which dates
back more than half a century to Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye. 36 In that
1950 case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: "The basic concept of
value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be
paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate
interest in a going concern." 37 Other cases have characterized this con-
cept in a shorthand way as "going concern value,"38 while still other
cases describe the concept as the true or "intrinsic" value of the stock
that has been taken by the merger."
Although these concepts are helpful in selecting appropriate fi-
nance methods for measuring fair value, there is room for ambiguity.
33 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262 (2008).
34 Id.
35 See id.
" See 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
57 Id.
38 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
39 See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455-56 (Del. Ch. 1934); see also Roessler v.
Sec. Say. & Loan Co., 72 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ohio 1947).
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For example, what is the "intrinsic" value of the stock, a term that has
no precise counterpart in finance theory?
In 1983, in Weinberger v. UOP Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
established that the method for measuring fair value should be gener-
ally accepted techniques used in the Financial community." As the
Delaware Supreme Court's direction has been applied over the years
since Weinberger; the Court of Chancery has increasingly come to favor
DCF analysis of modern finance theory as the principal approach to
measuring value. 41 In this theory, the value of an asset is the present
value of the discounted stream of future free cash flows that the asset
can generate. 42 The discount rate used in this method is one of several
mean/variance theories of discount rates, of which the most well
known is the capital asset pricing model.° The Weinberger decision and
its progeny thus establish that the technique to be applied, whenever
possible, in determining the "fair value" of shares is indeed the tech-
4° See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) ("[T]o the extent [the
Delaware block method] excludes other generally accepted techniques used in the finan-
cial community and the courts, it is now clearly outmoded. It is time we recognize this in
appraisal and other stock valuation proceedings and bring our law current an the sub-
ject.").
41 See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp„ No. 12334, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1997) (observing that the discounted cash flow approach is "increas-
ingly the model of choice for valuations in this Court"); Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709
A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[T]he discounted cash flow valuation methodology that
both sides have used and endorsed is the approach that merits the greatest confidence:),
affd, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997).
42 In 1999, in ONTI, Inc v. Integra Bank, the Court of Chancery of Delaware stated:
The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash
flows that the firm will generate and when, over some period; a terminal
value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection period, of the
firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital
with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows
and the estimated terminal or residual value.
751 A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129,
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990)). The terminal value can be es-
timated in a number of different ways. The court typically assigns the term "DCF analysis'
to one particular estimate of the terminal value; namely the Gordon growth model where
the terminal value is estimated by discounting to the present value the last period free cash
flow divided by the difference between the market capitalization or discount rate minus
the assumed future growth rate in free cash flow. However, DCF analysis, as that term is
used in modern finance, also includes methods where the terminal value is estimated by
capitalizing the last period earnings or book value by using either a stock market-based
price-earnings multiple or a multiple of book value. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 535-37 (9th ed. 2008).
43 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 42, at 215-16 (presenting a discussion of the capital
asset pricing model).
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nique that generations of business students have been taught as the
core approach to valuing assets."
This finance theory, however, is highly stylized and dependent on a
host of assumptions that are rarely met. In addition, this theory is in
fact weakest in those areas where appraisal is available. 45 The result is
competing definitions of "fair value." 46 For example, can market prices
be used as the best available measure of firm value? After all, finance
theory has canonized not only DCF analysis, but the efficient capital
market hypothesis as well, an endorsement that may appear to favor the
exclusive use of market prices as a measure of fair value. 47 Alternatively,
could third-party sale value be used in valuing the company? After all,
the definition of value used by economists is a version of third-party sale
value—that is, the opportunity cost of the asset in its next best use. 45
We address below some normative considerations in evaluating the
relative merits of adopting third-party sale or market value as the stan-
dard for determining the fair value of shares. 49 We turn first, however,
to the second instruction from the appraisal statute—excluding from
fair value "any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger." 5° This legal instruction, as we now show,
has the important consequence of precluding reliance on third-party
sale value as the determinant of the fair value of shares.'"
Third-party sale value necessarily derives from transactions in
which corporate control is acquired. 52 The Delaware cases establish,
however, that it is the nature of the enterprise itself at the time of the
44 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712; Grimes, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *3; Ryan, 709
A.2d at 702; BREALEY El' Al.., supra note 42, at 214-16.	 .
45 The capital asset pricing model applies only to publicly traded companies and thus
does not offer a theory for close corporations. In addition, the theory assumes that the
stock trades in liquid capital markets which rules out closely held, but publicly traded
stock. The courts' use of DCF analysis in evaluating close corporation shares thus depends
on the use of alternative methods for estimating the corporation's cost of equity capital
(for example, by reference to observations of trading in shares of comparable companies
the shares of which wade in liquid markets). See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at
125, n.33.
46 See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
47 Efficient markets and the capital asset pricing model are taught in all major finance
textbooks. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL, supra note 42; STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE
FINANCE (7th ed. 2005).
48 BREALEY ET Al.., supra note 42, at 14-15.
45 See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
5° DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262.
51 See id.
52 See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
.r
r t
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merger that is the key parameter in the valuation exercise. 55 Because
the prices paid in such transactions reflect elements of value created by
the transaction—notably synergies—that would not otherwise exist in
the enterprise itself, the use of such prices in determining fair value
conflicts with the statutory mandate that "any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolida-
tion" must be excluded. 54 Following this logic, Delaware case law has
consistently held that third-party sale value, to the extent that it in-
cludes synergies created by the merger, cannot be used as a measure of
fair value.55
One more preliminary point deserves noting: these two primary
valuation instructions from the appraisal statute dominate all discussion
by the Delaware courts of the fair value of shares and.not just in formal
statutory appraisal proceedings. 56 Although claims of breach of fiduci-
ary duty are generally considered to be outside the proper scope of ap-
55 M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999) ("[T]he corporation
must be valued as a going concern based upon the 'operative reality' of the company as of
the time of the merger."); Cede & Co., 684 A.2d at 298 ("[Tio the extent that value has
been added following a change in majority control before cash-out, it is still value attribut-
able to the going concern, i.e., the extant "nature of the enterprise," on the date of the
merger. The dissenting shareholder's proportionate interest is determined only after the
company has been valued as an operating entity on the date of the merger." (internal cita-
tion omitted)).
54 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262. We are aware that this conflict is not perfectly lit-
eral. See id. The Delaware appraisal statute merely excludes value arising from the specific
transaction giving rise to appraisal rights; it does not literally prohibit reference to syner-
gistic values arising in other transactions. See id. Still, and as the Court of Chancery has
properly concluded, a fair reading of the statute precludes a standard that would define
"fair value" by reference to a transaction—a hypothetical sale to a third party—that would
include elements of value solely arising from the transaction. See Union III. 1995 Inv. Ltd.
P'ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2004) (explaining that "[bly
its plain terms, § 262 only excludes from the amount awardable to the petitioners 'value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger' .... The literal terms of
§ 262 do not preclude a court from using a comparable-transactions analysis that considers
the price at which the subject company would likely sell in an auction.").
55 See infra notes 91-108, and accompanying text. As we have previously explained,
Weinbesger's discussion of the statutory exclusion of value attributable to the accomplish-
ment or expectation of the merger could be interpreted to preclude only elements of
value that are "speculative," and that non-speculative synergistic value might be taken into
account in determining fair value. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 126-27 (dis-
cussing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712). In our view, however, Weinberger's discussion is refer-
ring to the future value of the enterprise that is the target of the merger. See 457 A.2d at
712. More specifically, it is not referring to the new corporation or combination that will
result from the merger. See id. Accordingly, Vireinberger should not be interpreted to conflict
with the widely recited proposition that "fair value" may not include synergistic gains. See
id.
56 See Dxt. Conf. ANN., tit. 8, § 262.
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praisal proceedings," "fair price" —an evaluation of the fairness of the
price paid to minority shareholders in squeeze-out mergers by control-
ling shareholders—is a key component of the "entire fairness" standard
by which the courts evaluate ,the fiduciary conduct of controlling
shareholders."
Moreover, it is generally accepted in the Delaware case law and the
major treatises on Delaware corporate law that in evaluating the "entire
fairness" of a squeeze-out merger, "the courts generally utilize the same
valuation analysis for both the fair price prong of the fiduciary duty ac-
tion and the appraisal action."59 Indeed, the "fair price" component of
the "entire fairness" standard mirrors the definition of "fair value" as
articulated in the appraisal cases." As the Delaware Supreme Court ex-
plained in 1985 in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., "Mil terms of the concept
of fair price, Weinberger is consistent with Sterling u Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
... where this Court stated that the correct test of fairness is 'that upon
a merger the minority stockholder shall receive the substantial equiva-
lent in value of what he had before.'" 61 Accordingly, the valuation stan-
dard adopted under the appraisal statute will also serve an important
57 See, e.g., Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001); Ala.
By-Prods, Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 257 (Del. 1991) (acknowledging the pertinence of
unfair dealing in assessing credibility, but reiterating that "claims for unfair dealing cannot
be litigated in the context of a statutory appraisal").
55 See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11 ("When directors of a Delaware corporation
are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain," and "[Otte concept of
fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.").
59 See DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., 2-36 DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 36.06 (2008) (citing Gesoff v. !lc Indus. Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1153 n.127 (Del. Ch. 2006))
("[I}n general, the techniques used to determine the fairness of price in a non-appraisal
stockholder's suit are the same as those used in appraisal proceedings."); EDWARD P.
WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, POLE ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 251.6.2 (1999) ("In general, the techniques used to determine the fairness of price in a
non-appraisal stockholder's suit are the same as those used in appraisal proceedings."); see
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ararnark Corp., No. 16142, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 5, 1998) (recognizing "fiduciary duty to pay stockholders who are cashed out
the fair value of their stock as that term is defined in the appraisal cases and in the breach
of fiduciary duty cases in merger transactions").
60 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985).
61 Id. (quoting Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 114 (Del, 1952)); see
also WELCH & TUREZYN, supra note 59 ("[F]airness requires only that the consideration
paid be equivalent to the pre-merger value of the exchanged shares and pays no attention
whatsoever to any resulting post-merger gains.") (citing Harriman v. E.I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co., 411 F. Supp, 133, 154 (D. Del. 1975); Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 402
A.2d 382, 395 (Del. Ch. 1979) ("[Flailure of a dominant stockholder to recognize the pos-
sible synergistic effect of a merger in arriving at a price to be offered for the shares of the
stockholders being frozen out, is not therefore valid grounds to challenge the merger.") ).
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purpose in litigation, defining and enforcing the fiduciary duties of
controlling shareholders in squeeze-out transactions. 62
II. APPRAISAL THEORY, AGENCY COSTS, AND THE BENEFITS OF CONTROL
A. The Purpose of Share Valuation Remedies in Compulsory Buyouts
Before turning to the first of our central topics—the merits of al-
ternative standards for determining fair value—it is important to iden-
tify the problem that appraisal seeks to resolve. The traditional answer
supplied by the courts is that appraisal was a statutory price paid for
taking away an individual shareholder's right to veto a merger. 63 Be-
cause a merger agreed upon by two boards of directors acting at arms-
length is presumptively value enhancing, this hypothesized statutory
bargain removed a possible source of oppression by the minority: it de-
prived minority shareholders of the ability to hold out for non-pro rata
benefits in order to sell their veto power to the majority." On the other
hand, to avoid oppression of the minority by the majority, the hypothe-
sized statutory bargain required some mechanism to ensure that the
" See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 940. We acknowledge that one cannot assume that the ex-
isting legal remedies, such as appraisal and fiduciary duty litigation, that address the prob-
lem of what to pay forced sellers in compulsory buyouts are the optimal approach to the
issue. As John COates has pointed out, however, there is plenty of room for private order-
ing—most notably in charter provisions—to define solutions to the forced seller problem.
John C. Coates IV, "Fair Value" As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1287-95 (1999) (describing contract and
charter mechanisms to contract around Delaware appraisal law). Yet use of such private
ordering alternatives is rare at best, leaving a fair presumption that the combination of
appraisal and fiduciary duty remedies is at least a reasonable set of default rules. See id. at
1295.
" See, e.g., Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 893 (Del. 2002); Ala. By-Prods.
Corp. V. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995). The historical accuracy of this trade-
off story is questionable, however, given the fact that the appraisal remedy was often added
well after the adoption of statutes permitting mergers without unanimous consent. See
Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84
Cco. L.J. 1, 14 (1996).
Appraisal statutes are often presented as having been enacted in tandem with
mantes authorizing consolidation or merger by less than unanimous vote, but
' there was a significant difference in the spread of the two statutes. By the turn
of the century, a dozen states had statutes authorizing consolidations for cor-
porations generally, but only five of those states had appraisal statutes.
Id. On the other hand, even if the trade story did not happen in precisely the manner
traditionally suggested, the function of the merger statutes and the appraisal remedy to
eliminate minority hold-up of value-creating transactions remains significant. Id. at 15-16.
" See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 130.
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merger not be used by the majority to appropriate to itself value be-
longing to the minority shareholders. 65
Accordingly, the appraisal remedy has been structured to require
that mergers satisfy a Pareto superior test, under which the dissenting
shareholders are not made worse off." To implement this requirement,
the courts have insisted that merger proponents pay the dissenting
shareholders the cash equivalent of the present value of the future
benefits that such shareholders could have expected to receive if they
had continued to hold their shares. 67
Applying this formulation is not a trivial task, however, and even
with its limited reach, the appraisal remedy requires a carefully accom-
plished legal balancing act." Both parties have an interest in a legal
rule that encourages some individuals or entities to become control-
lers, while protecting the interests of the minority shareholders. 69 This
means that controllers can continue to exercise the rights of control,
which, in the context of the appraisal and merger statutes, means allow-
ing them to engage in squeeze-out mergers. 7° It also means protecting
minority shareholders so that they are willing to invest in companies
with controllers. 71 In cash-out mergers, the rule must ensure that the
minority shareholders are not made worse off by the transaction. 72
But minority shareholders also need controlling shareholders and
would be worse off if the legal rules made it unprofitable for control-
ling shareholders to serve in that capacity." The controlling sharehold-
65 See id. at 130-31.
66 See, e.g., FRANK FL EASTERRROOK & DANIEL R. FISCI1EL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 139 (1991) (stating that appraisals "require that shareholders receive
the equivalent of what they give up but do not require sharing of the gain from the change
in control").
67 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d at 298; see also Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989). The court in Cede Cc' Co. v. Technicolor; Inc.
stated:
The underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is that the dissenting
shareholders would be willing to maintain their investment position had the
merger not occurred. Accordingly, the Court of Chancery's task in an ap-
praisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the shareholder, i.e.,
the proportionate interest in the going concern.
684 A.2d at 298 (internal citation omitted).
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ers of the world are non-diversified shareholders who take on unsys-
tematic, company-specific risk by being incompletely diversified. 74 They
do so in return for the benefits of exercising control. 75 The obvious
benefit of having controlling shareholders is that agency costs are re-
duced because the interests of the controller are more aligned with the
corporation. 76 Minority shares can be a very profitable investment for
shareholders who essentially ride the coattails of the non-diversified,
and hence focused, controlling shareholder." With the correct balance
achieved, the controlling shareholder can exercise its rights of control,
restricted only by a constraint that it pay fair value when it acquires mi-
nority shares without their holders' consent, or, in other words, that its
actions not make the minority shareholders worse off. 78
B. Three Alternative Measures of Fair Value
Despite their early articulation of going concern value as the cor-
rect concept for defining fair value, 79 the Delaware courts have applied
a variety of other standards for measuring fair value. More specifically,
the courts have considered three principal approaches: market value,
third-party sale value, and going concern value as measured by the pre-
sent value of future free cash flows. The market value approach relies
on the market price of the shares to determine fair value. The third-
party sale value approach measures fair value by reference to the value
of the entire company in a hypothetical sale to a third party. The going
concern value approach measures fair value by reference to the value
of the company as a going concern, determined most commonly by
74 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 130, n. 51.
75 See id.
76 See infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text.
77 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 131.
78
 See id.
79 The term "going concern value" is standard parlance in the Delaware case law de-
scribing the valuation standard to be applied in statutory appraisal proceedings. See, e.g.,
Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., No. 19444-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171, at *17 (Del. Ch. Nov.
24, 2004), aff'd, 875 A.2d 632 (Del. 2005); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co.,
No. 19211, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *13 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2004); Prescott Group Small
Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., No. 17802, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *40 (Del. Ch. Sep. 8,
2004); Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 12207-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
108, at *56 (Del. Ch., July 30, 2004); Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com
 Inc., No. 19734, 2004
Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004); Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., No.
18462, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2004); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., No. 19239,
2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *6 (Del. Ch., July 25, 2003).
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using the discounted value of the company's future free cash flows. We
review the merits of each of these approaches below.
1. Market Value
The advocates of a share market value standard for determining
fair value assert that, because financial markets are efficient, one can
simply use the market value of the shares as the best available measure
of fair value. 80' In fact, the courts do rely on the efficiency of financial
markets to provide measures of fair value in cases where the appraisal
remedy is available. 81 Most notably, the courts necessarily rely on share
market pricing when they use the capital asset pricing model to select a
discount rate to apply in DCF analysis. 82 Likewise, they rely on share
market pricing when they add to the discount rate an estimate of the
excess returns experienced by small company stocks. 83
Share market prices, however, cannot be used to determine fair
value for the simple reason that in the types of cases where appraisal is
most likely to occur, there is either no publicly traded market price at
all or the share price may not reflect going concern value, for example,
because of illiquidity.m
Moreover, there are other reasons to question the utility of share
market prices in the important category of cases in which the merger
93 See BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 42, at 353-54 (making the point that all assets in effi-
cient markets sell for the value of their discounted free cash flow); Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Marcel Kahan, Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezcouts, in CONCEN-
• RATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 247, 250 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Benjamin Herma-
nn & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25J. LEG STUD. 351, 370 (1996).
al See infra notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 338-39 (Del. Ch.
2006) (discussing the role of the capital asset pricing model and its tensions with the
"build-up model" in estimating the weighted average cost of capital); Lane, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 108, at *113-14 (describing the capital asset pricing model method of deriving cost
of equity in estimating the weighted average cost of capital).
93 See, e.g., Gesoff v, EIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130, 1159 (Del. Ch. 2006) ('The small-size
premium, although somewhat controversial, is a generally accepted premise of both finan-
cial analyses and of this court's valuation opinions."); DeL Open MRI, 898 &2d at 338 n.129
(supporting the use of a premium on small-size stocks, despite the "great debate" over
whether it is appropriate); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 920 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("This Court has traditionally recognized the existence of a small stock premium in ap-
praisal matters.").
81 See, e.g., DeL Open MRI, 898 A.2d at 331; Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., No.
20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *57 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005); Lane, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEX1S 108, at *119; Borruso v. Corrunc'ns Telesys. Intl, 753 A.2d 451, 459-60 (Del. Ch.
1999), ONT.!, 751 A.2d at 915-16 ; Hodas v, Spectrum Tech., Inc., No. 11265, 1992 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 252, at *14-15 {Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992).
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involves a controlling shareholder, even where the minority's shares are
widely traded. An efficient market will value the firm based on the
plans of the controller. 88 If the market believes that the controller will
under-manage the firm or divert resources to its own use in a way that
evades judicial oversight, the price will fall to reflect this belief. se;
such situations, the financial markets' usual corrective mechanisms are
not available. Furthermore, and most importantly, the market for cor-
porate control is also absent because the controller can veto any trans-
action that it disfavors.87 Other market mechanisms will likewise fail to
work. For example, if the controller needs access to financial markets
in order to raise new capital, then market scrutiny would be present in
such circumstances. A controller interested in an opportunistic going-
private transaction, however, can easily avoid such controls by simply
timing the transaction to occur when there is no need to raise new
capital.
Indeed, defining "fair value" as market value would engender
uniquely detrimental incentives. Because the efficient market will cor-
rectly value the firm in terms of its discounted free cash flows, any op-
portunism that is known to the market will result in a lower stock price.
Consequently, in -the' case of publicly traded companies where a con-
troller is present, a market value definition for "fair value" would en-
courage opportunism. To the extent that fiduciary-duty litigation could
not remedy such opportunism, the market price of the shares would be
lower. A market value standard would thus reward the controller for
misappropriation by allowing it to take the corporation private at a
price reflecting such misappropriation. For that reason alone, share
market price cannot be a generally appropriate measure of fair value,
and particularly not in the most problematic situation, where a control-
ling shareholder is squeezing out minority shares.
Financial economists who adhere to a strong view of market effi-
ciency might claim, on the other hand, that market prices might be
used to determine fair value in the case of a publicly traded company
96 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supm note 6, at 132.
96 Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 80, at 250.
The very power of a controlling shareholder to freeze out the minority shares—
and to set the freezeout price equal to the prefreezeout market price—will de-
press the prefreezeout market price of the minority shares. As a result, the pre-
freezeout market price of minority share's will be substantially below the ex-
• petted 'intrinsic' value of the minority shares absent a freezeout.
Id.
87 See infra note 187.
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that has no controlling shareholder, but whose shares trade with a li-
quidity discount because they are thinly traded.88 The liquidity discount
means that the shares do not trade at the pro rata value of the enter-
prise.89 Should the value of the dissenters' shares in an appraisal case
include the discount?
A reasonable argument is that the dissenter should receive the re-
duced or discounted price. After all, when the shares do trade—albeit
infrequently—they trade at a lower price reflecting this discount. Con-
sequently, the average dissenter purchased shares at the average dis-
count. Awarding a non-discounted share value pays the dissenter a
greater value than the value of the shares that have been involuntarily
taken from him. Thus, one could argue that the fair value of the shares
of this enterprise should be reduced by the amount of the liquidity dis-
count. The law, however, rejects this argument," and so do we because
of the perverse incentives that it creates.
The concern here is the same as in the case of a corporation with a
controller: namely, the potential for opportunistic behavior by those in
control of the enterprise. The non-managing shareholders in such
thinly traded companies are protected by the right to vote in certain
transactions. Because they constitute a majority of the.shares (there be-
ing no controlling shareholder), they could presumably vote their
shares in their own interest, thereby reducing the potential for oppor-
tunism. But the voting solution is not sufficiently broad to protect even
a majority of the shareholders from actions taken by the shareholders
who serve on the board of directors. For example, the board could vote
to repurchase shares in the market, thereby exacerbating the discount
for lack of marketability. Moreover, such actions could precede an ac-
quisition in which those exercising control were equity participants in
the acquiring entity. The board, without shareholder approval, could
gain control and, absent a judicial unwillingness to give effect to liquid-
ity discounts, take advantage of,the minority by having accomplished
88 See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of 'Discounted"
Share Prices As an Acquisition Motive, 88 CoLum. L. REV. 891, 891 (1988) (It is "a common
presumption in the finance literature that informed securities prices credibly estimate the
underlying value of corporate assets.").
99 See SHANNON P. PRATT El' AL., VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 414 (4th ed. 2000) ("This valuation adjustment, or discount,
is the discount for illiquidity (i.e., the discount for lack of marketability of the controlling
business ownership in terest.)").
9D See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1145 ("The application of a discount to a mi-
nority shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the company be viewed as a 'going
concern.'").
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the earlier liquidity reducing purchases. Therefore, share-market prices
cannot be relied upon to determine fair value in this situation as well.
2. Third-Party Sale Value
The second potential standard for determining fair value in ap-
praisal is third-party sale value. 91
 The attractiveness of this standard is
that if the value of the entity is the controlling consideration, then the
reference to the sale price of the entity is consistent with a standard
that relies on the price at which individual shares would be bought and
sold by willing buyers and sellers at market transactions. The simple
extension is to state that the relevant market transaction is the purchase
of all the shares and not simply the minority shares.
On the surface, third-party sale value may appear attractive be-
cause it fits the definition  of value that is typically employed in econom-
ics and fmance. 92
 Economics and finance teach us that the value of an
asset is its opportunity cost or, alternatively stated, its value in its next
best nse.99
 The term "next-best-use" does indeed rely on indicators of
third-party sale value."
At the outset, however, we advance a normative objection to the
third-party sale value standard as a determinant of "fair value" in the
case of compulsory share buyouts. The premise of our objection is that
estimates of third-party sale value necessarily lbok to acquisitions of
companies deemed comparable to the firm in question; thus, those es-
timates necessarily include value attributable to some, or even all, of the
synergies anticipated by the buyers. We have already seen that such syn-
ergies must be excluded, for legal reasons, in determining fair value. 95
91
 See, e.g., In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1004
(Me. 1989).
The valuation focus under the appraisal statute is not the stock as a commod-
ity, but rather the stock only as it represents a proportionate part of the en-
terprise as a whole. The question for the court becomes simple and direct:
What is the best price a single buyer could reasonably be expected to pay for
the firm as an entirety? The court then prorates that value for the whole firm
equally among all shares of its common stock.
Id.




 See supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text. Thus, the Delaware courts have in re-
cent years come to estimate fair value, in cases where the company is acquired by a third
party, by reference to the acquisition price less estimated synergies associated with the
transaction. See, e.g., Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 59 (Del. Ch.
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They must, therefore, be excluded for the normative reason that they
reflect value to which shareholders have no individual entitlement;
share ownership carries with it the right to share in the profits of the
corporation itself, but it does not carry with it the right to share in the
profits associated with a different, combined enterprise.
Similarly, estimates of third-party sale value derived from compa-
rable company acquisitions commonly include value associated with the
acquisition of control from disaggregated shareholders. As we discuss
below, such acquisitions of control create material benefits—indeed, it
is widely understood that acquirers of firms pay a premium for obtain-
ing control.96 But as we also discuss below, control is another element
of value to which shareholders who do not have control have no enti-
tlement; ownership of disaggregated noncontrolIing shares carries with
it the right to participate in the profits of the corporation itself, but
does not carry with it the right to participate in the profits of the cor-
poration *managed differently in the hands of someone with contro1. 97
Excluding value associated with control from the measurement of fair
value does not impose a "minority discount;" 98 it simply denies share-
holders value that does not inhere in the firm in which they are in-
vested. Thus, third-party sale value is an inappropriate standard for de-
termining the fair value of dissenting shares because it incorporates
elements of value—associated with acquisitions of control by third par-
ties—that do not belong to the acquired enterprise or to shares of stock
in that enterprise.
There is also a more subtle policy objection to the use of third-
party sale value in determining "fair value"—one that identifies a po-
tential for creating perverse incentives. That objection begins with the
observation that the economics definition of value is an equilibrium
concept because all resources are assumed to be in their best use. 99 In
2007) (holding that a court may derive fair value by using the third party sale price "if the
sale of the company in question resulted from an arm's-length bargaining process ...
[but] [t]he court must, however, exclude synergistic elements from the sale price to arrive
at a fair value."); Union 111. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340,
343 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that when the sales process is effective, "fair value is the value
of the Merger Price minus synergies").
96 See infra notes 141-154 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 126-177 and accompanying text.
" Whatever that is. Various authorities make clear that "fair value" must not be re-
duced by a "minority discount," but they do not explain what a minority discount is, or
how it might be measured. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) Official Comment
on "Fair Value" (2008); AAL LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2005) § 7.22(a) & cmt. C.
" See BREALEY El' AL., supra note 42, at 16.
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equilibrium, all value-enhancing transactions have already taken place,
so that the opportunity cost or next-best-use of the corporation's assets
has a lower value than the resources in their current use. 100
It is true that real-world purchases of assets take place at a pre-
mium. It is these transactions that bring the economic system into equi-
librium. Accordingly, commentators argue that the definition of fair
value should be taken from the price paid by a willing buyer of control
of the asset. 10 ' We agree with this proposition, at least in general: when
there is a third-party bid for a corporation or its assets, then the value of
the bid represents a reasonable measure of value—perhaps not "fair
value," but certainly value in some sense. 102
It is incorrect, however, to assume that most corporations would be
sold at a premium if they were.put on the auction block. In the world of
real transactions all that we see is a highly selective set of transactions—
namely those cases where a willing buyer has emerged who is willing to
pay more than the company's going concern value. It is reasonable to
assume that the lack of active bids for the vast majority of corporations
reflects the idea that most of the time, most of the assets are indeed in
their best use. The next-best-use would be at a lower price. This is the
story about the dogs that do not bark.'" We hear only the dogs that
bark; most of the time, the vast majority of dogs are not barking.
The non-barking dog metaphor explains why, even in a world with
huge amounts of capital available to take public companies private, the
number of transactions relative to the number of companies remains
tiny.'" There should be no presumption that all corporations could be
If other investors agree with your forecast of a $420,000 payoff and your as-
sessment of its risk, then your property ought to be worth $375,000 once con-
struction is underway. If you tried to sell it for more, there would be no tak-
ers, because the property would then offer an expected rate of return lower
than the 12% available in the stock market. Thus the office building's present





im See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE
COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED SHORT STORIES 235, 254 (2002).
I" In 2007, for example, there were 980 acquisitions of public companies (including
acquisitions of controlling interests), as compared to approximately 12,000 public compa-
nies (defined as those registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1935). SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
OCTOBER 1, 2008 — MARCH 31 5 (2009), available at http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/
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sold at a higher valuation were they forced to be put up for bid. 105 Al-
though we recognize that transaction costs associated with acquisitions
prevent the market for corporate control from eliminating all subopti-
mal pricing discrepancies, it is simply implausible to believe that un-
derpriced stocks are persistently passed over by private equity firms,
hedge funds, and other institutional investors.
In fact, in cases of well-managed firms, the absence of a third-party
acquisition bid suggests that there is no buyer willing to pay more than
the firm's going concern value, and a third-party sale value standard
would provide a lower share valuation than the going concern value
standard. 106 The flaw of the third-party sale value argument is that it
assumes that assets are generally deployed inefficiently so that a higher
use is readily available in an appraisal setting. One reason that the great
majority of firms are not up for sale at every moment is that higher
bidders do not naturally lurk in the shadows waiting for the "for sale"
sign to be posted.
This set of observations brings us once again to the problem of
perverse incentives. What would happen if a third-party sale value rule
governed the determination of fair value? Again, we examine the case
of a controller that wants to take the company private. Suppose the
company is very well managed by the controller. Under the going con-
cern value standard, these efficient managers have to pay their share-
holders the going concern value which includes their efforts as efficient
managers. 1 °7 Suppose the third-party sale view were taken literally; that
is, the dissenters' shares would be appraised at the highest bid. In some
cases, management may be the only bid and, in many cases, the effi-
cient managers may be the highest possible bidders. Because the effi-
cient managers only have to beat the next best offer in an auction set-
Semiannual/2009/semiapr09.pdf; FACTSET MERGERSTAT, LLC, AcquismoNs OF PUB-
LICLY TRADED COMPANIES, 1993-2007 (2008).
105 See ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION 481 (2d ed. 2006) ("[T]he
control premium should be zero for firms where management is already making the right
decisions."); PRATT. ET AL., supra note 89, at 358-59 (identifying acquisitions of control at
discounts, rather than premiums, to prior public trading prices); Gilbert E. Matthews,
Misuse of Control Premiums in Delaware Appraisals. 27 Bus. VAL. 'WT. 107, 115 (2008)
("[C]ontrol value of a company may not differ greatly [from] and may even be below its
publicly traded minority share value." (quoting PHILIP J. CLEMENTS & PHILIP W. WISLER,
THE STANDARD & POOR'S GUIDE TO FAIRNESS OPINIONS 94 (2005)).
106 See Matthews, supra note 105, at 114 (referring to "the dot.com " euphoria as a
"clear example[] of periods when most companies in certain industries trade at prices that
exceed the price that any cash buyer would pay").
107 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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ting by a small amount, they could buy the company for less than going
concern value.
In effect, a third-party sale value rule, would create a new potential
for controller opportunism. The current concern is that the controller
will use the squeeze-out when the going concern value is low and about
to increase. 108
 Under a third-party sale value rule the concern would be
the converse, namely that the controller would time the squeeze-out to
occur when third-party sale value is arguably lower than going concern
value. In particular, a controller could wait until acquisition price ratios
are unusually low, and rely on such deflated ratios to justify a fair value
that would undervalue the . firm's going concern value.
3. Going Concern Value
The third possible measure of fair value, and the one adopted by
the courts, is the going concern value standard. 109
 Going concern
value, or more directly, the enterprise value, is estimated using DCF
analysis, which is simply the discounted value of the free cash flows
generated by the company's assets." 0
As we have previously observed, DCF analysis is a forward-looking
concept that must be divided into two components." The first com-
ponent is the free cash flows generated by the assets already owned by
the firm.'" Although the future cash flows can vary with the business
cycle and industry conditions, the current asset base of the company is
knoWn and there are various methods of determining the value of the
108
 As we discuss in the next section, we believe that going concern value, appropri-
ately calculated, can deal with this problem. See infra notes 109-125 and accompanying .
text. '
I" See, e.g., Harnett, 564 A.2d at . 1144-45; Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137,
140-42 (Del. 1980).
no See supra note 42 and accompanying text. This DCF-oriented approach to "fair
value." however, is probably inappropriate in regard to investments other than common
stock. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Metromedia Intl Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 900 (Del. Ch.
2009). In appraisal cases involving preferred stock with limited returns and other defining
contractual features, the case law emphasizes a valuation based on an assessment of the
value of those contract rights. See id. ("Pi he valuation of preferred stock must be viewed
through the defining lens of its certificate of designation, unless the certificate is ambigu-
ous or conflicts with positive law."); In or Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock,
698 A.2d 973, 977 (Del. Ch. 1997) (terms of the preferred stock defining what the holder
is entitled to receive in a merger control the determination of "fair value").
nt See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 137.
112 See id.
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free cash flows that it will generate that are consistent with DCF analy-
sis.'"
The term "going concern," however, may obscure the second
component of DCF analysis because it conjures up a picture of a firm
with a fixed capital stock that is owned by the firm and is fully known at
the time of the valuation exercise.'" This picture is incomplete. Typi-
cally; a company that is generating free cash flow does not pay it all out
in dividends. 115
 Instead, some of that cash will be used to reinvest in
profitable projects. 116
 Thus, the decision to retain earnings amounts to
a manifestation that there are future profitable investment opportuni-
ties for the corporation. These investment opportunities belong to the
corporation and are a component of the firm's going concern value.
Consequently, the present value of the firm is not only the free cash
flows from the existing assets, but also the free cash flows that will be
earned on the new investments to be made from retained earnings." 7
This second component can easily be as large as or larger than the first,
but, in any case, it cannot be ignored. In finance textbook terminology,
this second element is the present value of the firm's growth opportu-
nities. 118 In total, then, the firm can be divided into the present value of
a level stream of earnings based on the current assets and the present
value of the growth opportunities generated by reinvestment opportu-
nities. 119
This two-part conception of DCF analysis conveniently addresses
valuation disputes in the most difficult cases, where the controller
squeezes out the minority shareholders, and where there is the greatest
313 See BREALEY ET Al.., supra note 42, at 98.
114 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 137.
115 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 42, at 442.
"6 See id.
117 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 137-38.
118 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 42, at 99-101.
115 This breakdown of value into the two components is different from, and should not
be confused with, the other two-part division used by the courts in the calculation of fair
value using a DCF analysis. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 138. In this stan-
dard and well-accepted calculation, there is an initial period where annual forecasts are
available on the key parameters and a terminal value where one resorts to an estimate
about future growth and discount rates applicable in the future. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. JRC
Acquisition Corp„ No. 18648-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004).
This two-part formulation is also the most common way of performing a DCF in appraisal
cases. See id. The reinvestment opportunity component is not an overlapping concept with
terminal value. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 138. Indeed, in our categoriza-
tion reinvestment opportunities are likely to have a significant effect on value by affecting
the cash flows during the period when annual forecasts of the key parameters are available.
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 42, at 97.
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potential for the controller to take exclusive advantage of new rein-
vestment opportunities available to the firm. The finance perspective
would say that these opportunities should be included as long as they
are known to the controller and are part of the corporate policy of the
existing firm before the merger, whether or not they are disclosed to
anyone else at that time.'" Consequently, the correct calculation of the
value of the firm includes the discounted free cash flows from these
opportunities.' 21
The law should—and usually does—produce the same results.' 22 If
the minority shareholders were not being squeezed out, they could
continue to hold the stock into the future.'" What they lose in the
squeeze-out is thus the discounted value of the free cash flows of both
the original assets and the return on the reinvestment opportunities.' 24
These shareholders can then 'be made no worse off, as long as they are
paid their proportional share of both components of that discounted
value. 125
•WHAT IS THE CONTROVERSY?
The discussion above makes the normative case supporting the
Delaware courts' use of going concern value as the correct standard for
determining the fair value of dissenters' shares in a merger. 126 Similarly,
the discussion supports the courts' use of DCF analysis as the preferred
method for calculating going concern value. 127
 Up to this point there is
no controversy. It is also uncontroversial that when the DCF methodol-
ogy is used to estimate going concern value, one can move seamlessly
between enterprise and share value by either multiplying the share
price by the number of shares or dividing enterprise value by the num-
ber of shares. 128
120 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 42, at 99-102.
121 see id.
122 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 138.
03 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
124 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 138.
125 see id.
126 See supra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
127
 See supra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
128
 This proposition is generally correct, but does need to be slightly adjusted to fit the
corporation that has debt as well as equity. In the standard valuation methodology, the
market value of the debt is first subtracted from the value of the enterprise's total invested
capital. The value of the equity is then estirnated using the capital asset pricing model.
With the debt removed, the ability to move between the value of the enterprise and the
value of the shares by either multiplying or dividing by the number of outstanding shares is
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The potential for controversy arises when the data for a DCF analy-
sis is either not available or not entirely reliable, and the expert relies
on comparable company analysis to estimate going concern value. In
that method, the trading prices of comparable companies are the start-
ing point for the analysis. Those trading prices provide the basis for
multiples such as price/earnings ("P/E") ratios or market/book ratios.
The ratios, in turn, are then used to calculate the enterprise value. For
example, suppose the comparable company has earnings of $1 a share
and a share price of $15, yielding a P/E ratio of fifteen. If the company
being appraised earns $1.67 per share, then the P/E multiple of fifteen
is applied to its earnings, yielding a share value of $25.
In standard finance, there is still no controversy, assuming that the
"comparable companies" are truly comparable. In the example above,
the value of the shares of the appraised company is $25 and the value
of the enterprise is the share value multiplied by the number of shares.
If there are one million shares outstanding, the enterprise value of the
corporation is $25 million. Finance texts routinely conclude or assume
that traded share prices of companies—whether of comparable com-
panies or the appraised company—trade at the value of the enterprise
divided by the number of shares." To move from share value to enter-
prise equity value requires only a multiplication of the number of out-
standing shares by the share value estimated via comparable company
analysis. No finance text claims that the result has to be adjusted up-
ward on the premise that the comparable companies' share prices im-
pound some inappropriate discount.
The Delaware courts, on the other hand, have had problems
reaching the same conclusion)" The competing judicial view to the
restored. With the equity value of the corporation so estimated, the market value of the
debt is added back in to yield the enterprise value.
In See BREALEY ET AL.. supra note 42, at 88-91. Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe define the
value of common stocks in an identical fashion. STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE Ft-
NANCE 109 (6th ed. 2002). These textbooks define the value of a stock as the discounted
value of dividends and elsewhere define the value of the firm as the discounted value of
future free cash flows. As Damodaran points out, these values measure the same thing—
cash flows to equity holders. DiuktoonitAN, supra note 105, at 174-75. Damodaran discusses
scenarios in which dividend discounting and free cash flow discounting could lead to dif-
ferent valuations, namely when free cash flows are neither paid as dividends nor reinvested
in the firm. Id. at 188. However, these scenarios may represent a form of an agency cost
which, as discussed in detail below, are appropriately reflected in (a reduced) going con-
cern value. See infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text. In any event, Damodaran notes
that his analysis switches freely between per share and aggregate valuations. See DAMODA-
RAN, supra note 105, at 191-92. He makes no mention of a need to include a discount
when moving from a value of the firm as a whole to the value of individual shares. See id
1" See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 19, at 7-24.
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finance theory proceeds along the following lines. First, enterprises are
routinely sold at a premium relative to their shares' trading prices.'"
Second, synergies—value created by the business combination itself—
account for only some, and perhaps very little, of such acquisition pre-
rniums. 132 Therefore, the value of the enterprise itself necessarily ex-
ceeds the trading value of its shares. An explanation proffered for this
distinctive viewpoint is that the shares and the entity are separate com-
modities; the shares have limited rights and, in particular, limited con-
trol, and therefore inherently do not reflect the full value of the enter-
prise itself.'" Thus, the courts have held that share trading prices
incorporate an "implicit minority discount" ("IMD") relative to enter-
prise value."4 The size of the IMD adjustment is substantial, with the
more recent cases favoring a thirty percent adjustment. 135
In our example above, the appraised company's stock price is cal-
culated to be $25 before the IMD adjustment. If an IMD adjustment of
thirty percent is used, then the appraisal litigation awards the dissent-
ing shareholders a price of $32.50 per share.
Let us return to the comparable company for a moment and see
how that company's value would be determined in an appraisal hear-
ing. Consistent with finance texts, we say that the $15 trading price of
the comparable company's stock reflects the present value of its future
free.cash flows. An IMD-based award, however, would value that com-
pany's shares at $19.50 instead of $15. In other words, the IMD award
would view the comparable company as having a value of $19.50 per
share, thus valuing the company as if, contrary to fact, it was owned by a
controlling shareholder and was thus free of the agency costs associated
with the separation of ownership and control. •
Taken literally, the courts' insistence on the existence of an im-
plicit minority discount cannot be squared with modern precepts of
corporate finance, which argue that efficient financial markets' share
prices reflect the pro rata value of the corporation's discounted free
cash flows.'" In an efficient market, a firm with a DCF value of $19.50
131 See id. at 30.
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser. Efficient Markets, Costty Informa-
tion, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 825 (1985) ("IT] here is no basis for the
assertion that prices prevailing in the stock market measure value of a firm to a potential
acquiror.").
1 " See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com , Inc., No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at
*45-47 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004); see also Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 19, at 20-24.
135 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 19, at 23.
136 See id. at 49.
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cannot consistently and persistently be trading at $15 per share. Assum-
ing that the comparable company also has one million shares out-
standing, the direct implication is that the company's enterprise value
based on its trading shares is $15 million whereas the enterprise value,
based on a DCF analysis, is actually $19.5 million.
We believe that the solution to reconciling this inconsistency lies in
the fact that markets may be efficient at pricing minority shares, but
minority shares are worth less than control shares. Hence in our exam-
ple, the minority shares are worth $15, while the control shares are
worth $19.50. In other words, the comparable company has an indi-
cated enterprise value of $15 million based on trading share prices, but
it would be worth $19.5 million if valued from the perspective of a con-
troller. Consequently, one cannot move seamlessly between the publicly
traded share price of $15 per share and the enterprise value of $19.5
million. Simply multiplying the share trading price of $15 by the one
million outstanding shares no longer yields the value of the firm.'"
The basis for this disconnect emerges clearly from the Delaware
courts' reasons for making an adjustment for the perceived implicit
minority discount. 138 Quite simply, the courts view the adjustment as
necessary in order to share the value of control among all sharehold-
ers. 139 As best expressed by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the 2004
Doff Ce Co. v. Travelocity.com case, "apprisal cases ... correct the valua-
tion for a minority discount by adding back a premium 'that spreads
the value of control over all shares equally' :140
We applaud the clarity with which the Delaware courts have put
forward their control value-spreading rationale for adjusting for a per-
ceived implicit minority discount. 141 As a general matter, however, this
rationale is inconsistent with appraisal theory as expounded above. 142
To explain why this is so, it is necessary to examine the value created
when a controller aggregates previously disaggregated corporate
t!7
	
example assumes that there are no synergies in taking the firm private. We
could easily adjust the numbers to reflect the synergies, but the result would only be a
more complex example without a difference in results.
1" See, e.g., De, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *46-47 (citing Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d
880, 887 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
1]9
	 id.
140 See id. ("[C]orrection for a minority discount requires the addition of a premium
that spreads the value of control over all shares equally."); see also Bomarko, Inc. v lnt'l
Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1186-87 n.11 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del.
2000); Borruso v. Commc'ns Telesys. Intl, 753 A.2d 451, 458-59 (Del. Ch. 1999).
1141 See, e.g., Doft, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXLS 75, at *46-47 (citing Agranoff, 791 A.2d at 887).
142 See supra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
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shares. If, as we believe, the value of control is a significant component
of acquisition premiums, the critical issue emerges: to whom does the
value of control belong? Is it value belonging to the enterprise itself, as
the Delaware courts have suggested, so that the fair value of corporate
shares must include their proportional share of such control value? Or
should the value of control be said to belong to the person possessing it
and not to the enterprise itself? We assert that it belongs to the individ-
ual or entity that creates control by aggregating the shares.
In order to discuss our reasoning, we first need to address two re-
lated concepts: agency costs and the benefits of control. As explained
below, we believe that these two concepts, properly understood, dem-
onstrate that the value of owning a controlling block. of corporate
shares should not be viewed as belonging to the enterprise itself, and as
a consequence, the existence of acquisition premiums does not estab-
lish that share trading prices inherently and systematically understate
enterprise value.
A. Agency Costs
To understand the concept of agency costs and its relation to the
issue at hand, it is useful to differentiate among types of firms accord-
ing to whether they have a controller and, if so, whether there are mi-
nority shareholders. The two polar cases are the firm with a sole con-
trolling shareholder who also manages the firm and the firm without a
controlling shareholder where the shares are owned by a fluid disag-
gregation of shareholders. We denote the value of the firm where the
owners are the managers as VOM and the value of the firm with disag-
gregated shareholders and no controller as ITN°
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means were among the first to point out
that the separation of ownership and control provides managers with
discretion to further their own interests rather than the interests of
shareholders. 143
 The result of this separation is agency costs ("AC"),
which create a wedge between the values of the same firm when it is
owner-managed and when the managers are not the owners. 144
143 See Anour A. 13551.E & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE. PROPERTY 116 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) ("The concentration of eco-
nomic power separate from ownership has, in fact,'created economic empires, and has
delivered these empires into the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating 'owners' to
the position of those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercies [sic]
their power.").
1 “ See Hamermesh &Wachter, supm note 19, at 33.
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We therefore have:
VArc = Vom — AC
Since the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling, it has been
recognized that in transactions that disperse ownership (such as initial
public offerings), the burden of agency costs falls on the owner-
managers who are separating ownership from contro1. 145 As they wrote:
[T] he owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these ex-
pected costs so long as the equity market anticipates these ef-
fects. Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the
owner-manager's interests will diverge somewhat from theirs,
hence the price which they will pay for shares will reflect the
monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the
manager's interest and theirs."
The agency costs thus reflect the assumption that managers. will
maximize their own welfare, which will not be entirely consistent with
the interest of the corporation) 47 The agency cost concept includes the
full cost of the managers' compensation, including the part of the
compensation that is above what the firm needs to pay to hire the man-
agers in the competitive labor market.l`ls It also includes any higher
supplier costs, employee labor costs, etc., that the managers allow to
creep into the cost structure because they bear a relatively small part of
the loss. 149 The agency cost concept may also include whatever revenue
sources are lost if the managers are less attentive to customer needs
once they are no longer the owner-operators of the firm. 15° Finally,
agency costs include the high bonding costs associated with the disclo-
sure and other requirements of publicly traded companies. 151 Whatever
145 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior;
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976).
146 See id.
147 See id. In its simplest terms, the owner-manager may be willing to work 24-7, while
the CEO with a one percent ownership stake may work more civilized hours. See Hamer-
mesh & Wachter, supra note 19, at 34. This divergence also explains why owner-managers
are willing to sell the company at a price which discounts the agency costs. See id. After the
transaction, the original owner-managers can work a less hectic schedule. See id. In addi-
tion, the original owners are willing to bear the agency costs because they benefit from the
ability to diversify their wealth with the cash received from the sale. See id.
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they include, the agency costs of the firm with dispersed ownership are
reflected in the free cash flows of the firm.
Management actions that give rise to agency costs do not in any
way necessarily involve a violation of fiduciary duties. Agency costs are
as real a cost as any other. 152
 This is also not to deny that agency costs
may include the effects of breaches of fiduciary duty. In general, how-
ever, agency costs are an inevitable burden on publicly held companies
and largely involve no breach of fiduciary duty at all.
The process of separating ownership and control thus results in a
loss in corporate value equal to the size of the agency costs. The reverse
is true in a going-private transaction, where ownership and control are
once again unified. The process of unifying ownership and control cre-
ates value by eliminating the agency costs associated with separation of
ownership and control.
One immediate implication of this analysis is that if the ownership-
dispersing transaction is reversed, by means of a transaction that aggre-
gates share ownership, the shareholders do not have to be compen-
sated for the agency costs. The shares sold by the original owner were
discounted by the amount of the agency costs and thus the manager
taking the firm private should pay Visic to the cashed out shareholders
and not the higher VOM that includes the value of reduced agency costs.
In the appraisal setting, the now cashed out shareholders receive the
going concern value of the holdings that they sell, ViNc, which are net of
the agency costs.
Agency cost reductions are thus a factor, separate from synergies,
that create value in change-in-control transactions.'" For the moment,
we put aside the synergies question since there is no controversy in
how, at least conceptually, synergistic gains from a merger are to be
treated. As noted earlier, all commentators agree that such gains must
be excluded in determining fair value. 154
 That leaves the question as to
who owns or should be credited for the reduction in agency costs: the
controller who aggregates the shares or the minority shareholders?
152 See id. at 34. For example, an agency cost is the compensation of the CEO that ex-
ceeds the labor market clearing compensation of comparably skilled managers. See id.
While such compensation may at times be viewed as excessive, it is not necessarily or even
ordinarily, a breach of fiduciary duty. See id. In general, the existence of agency costs does
not the taking of a corporate opportunity, the use of corporate assets for private
purposes, or engaging in conflicted transactions without board approval. See id. at 34-35.
153 See id. at 35.
154
 See supra notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
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B. Identifying and Allocating the Benefits of Control
As this Article argued above, the aggregation of shares, which
eliminates agency costs in the process, is a value-creating transaction. 155
It conies as no surprise, then, that control achieved through the aggre-
gating of shares is distinctly valuable and that acquirers pay premiums
over disaggregated share prices to obtain 4. 156 Control blocks are worth
more because of the greater ability of the controller to direct the strat-
egy of the furm. 157 This enhanced control includes the ability of the
controller to appoint or change management, determine compensa-
don, set operational and strategic policy, and change the course of the
business. 158
Finance theorists and the courts both recognize these benefits. 159
For example, Aswath Damodaran discusses the control premium en-
tirely as value brought by changes in management. 16° He differentiates
between the present value of the corporation and its optimal value,
where the difference reflects the changes in policy brought by man-
agement. 161
 In a recent article, Damodaran is more explicit, stating
"that the value of controlling a firm has to lie in being able to run it
differently (and better) ."I62 To the same effect, Chirstopher Mercer
and Travis Harms present a diagram similar to the one set out below, in
which: (1) the "financial control" premium and the "minority interest
discount" are identical, (2) those adjustments equally explain the dif-
ference between "financial control value" and "marketable minority"
value,' 63 and (3) the so-called "marketable minority value" can be de-
rived from a DCF analysis, i.e. a valuation generated "by 'build-up'
155 See supra notes 126-154 and accompanying text.
156 See PRATT ET AL., supra note 89, at 349.
157 See id.
' 58 Id. at 347-48.
150 See, e.g., DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 495 (reporting evidence of premiums paid
to acquire large blocks of shares); see also Paramount Commc'ns. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (characterizing the control premium as the price for the
"privilege of exerting the powers of majority ownership ...."); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548, 555 (Del. 1964) ("IA) substantial block of stock will normally sell at a higher price
than that prevailing on the open market, the increment being attributable to a 'control
premium.'").
150 See DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 457.
161 see id.
162 Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications for Control Premia, Minority Dis-
counts and Voting Share Differentials, 2 (Stern Sch. of Bus., 2005), available at http://pages.
stern.nyu.edu/-adamodar/pditles/papers/con  trolvalue.pdf.
163 In this Article, we identify "financial control value" as Vom and "marketable minor-
ity" value as
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methodologies that develop capitalization rates by estimating required
rates of return in relation to public markets."164
"..,, -	 !	 S'IttUCTURE OF DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS
Value Per Share Premium/Discount
$20.00 Nonmarke table Minority Value 	
. Adjustment A
$25.00.... V2N,c Going Concern value
(Value of freely traded shares)
$5.00 (25% pretrtitum to eliMinate marketability
.,	 discount)
: !NIP] '-- Adjustment B
$32.50... VW Value of shares with a
controller.
 .$7.50 (30% premium reflecting value of control)
Adjustment C
$40.00.... V3p Value of shares in a 3rd
party acquisition. (Includes synergies)
 $7.50 (23% acquisitiOn premium; with
Adjustment B, a 60% premium over freely traded
shai-e.value)
This table illustrates three issues that need to be resolved in a
valuatiOn proceeding. First, do minority shareholders receive the value
of shares discounted for a lack of marketability or do they receive going
concern value, V./sic? In our example, do they receive $20 or $25? The
case law is settled on this point—the minority shareholder receives
$25. 165
 This resolution of the question is perfectly consistent with our
normative discussion of the issues. 166
Secondly, do the dissenting shareholders receive the synergies re-
sulting from the merger? In this case, as a matter of statute, the dissent-
ing shareholders do not receive the synergies, and there is a good nor-
mative reason for this statutory rule. 167
 The value created by the merger
would not exist but for the merger proposed by the bidder. To encour-
age bidders to create value through proposing such mergers, the bid-
der should receive the value that it creates, even if the target company
shareholders receive some of that value in a negotiated deal. In our ta-
ble, then, the dissenting shareholders do not receive the $40 that in-
cludes the acquisition premium.
164 Z. CHRISTOPHER MERCER & TRAVIS W. HARMS, BUSINESS VALUATION: AN INTE-
GRATED THEORY, 64, 71 (2nd ed. 2008).
165
 Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 147 (Del. 1980) (mentioning that there
is no authority in Delaware corporate law for granting discounts for lack of a market);
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, No. 7959, 1988 Del Ch. LEXIS 28, at *30 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22,
1988) (explaining that in appraisal cases, the thing being valued is the entire corporation
as a going concern, not individualized configurations of its shares").
166 See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
167 See DEL. Coot: ANN., tit. 8, § 262 (2008).
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Finally, do minority shareholders receive the value of control that
is created by the aggregation of shares and the creation of a new con-
troller? In our example, do they receive $25, or $32.50? Embracing the
concept of an Implicit minority discount," the courts would award the
dissenters $32.50 instead of $25, on the theory that fair value should
not be reduced for lack of contro1. 168
But to whom does the value of control belong? For our purposes,
the key point is that the aggregation of the shares is value-creating be-
cause a controller can then exercise the control rights involving direct-
ing the strategy and managing the firm. 169 Absent a controller, the cor-
poration is valued at the lower VNC rather than at the higher Vom. That
is, for the dispersed shareholders the value of their corporation is VNC.
Since the value is created by the aggregation process and does not exist
independent of it, the logical and normatively compelling conclusion is
that the value creation should accrue to the party that has created it.
The normative justification for awarding the value of control to
the controller parallels the rationale for awarding the value of synergies
to the bidder. Efficiency requires that those who create an efficient
transaction—either through creating synergies or eliminating agency
costs—should receive the value that they create. As a normative matter,
awarding synergies or control value to the dissenters is normatively in-
correct because it confers upon them a share of value that they have
not created.
The situation is different, however, where an already existing con-
troller squeezes out the minority shareholderS. In this situation, control
is already present, and the value of the company already incorporates
the benefits of reduced agency costs. If the controller decides to
squeeze out the minority shareholders, there will perhaps be some
value creation, but it is likely to be relatively sinall. 170 The gain is the
' 5" See Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., No. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *70
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) . ("What is being corrected for [by adding a control premium] is
the difference between the trading price of a minority share and the trading price if all the
shares were sold."); Borruso, 753 A.2d at 458-59 n.10 (finding that "[the market value of
invested capital] derived using the comparable companies approach does not reflect any
element of value for control" and must be adjusted by applying a control premium); Le
Beau v. M. G. Bancorp., Inc., No. 13414, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *39 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29,
1998) (explaining that a control premium is not the result of post-merger synergies, but
"blather [it] reflects an independent element of value existing at the time of the merger
").
160 See PRATT ET AL., =pre; note 89, at 347-48.
170 hi fact, in their treatment of control, neither Pratt nor Damodaran identifies or
discusses a value associated with eliminating minority shareholders. See DAMODARAN, supra
note 105, at 457-96; PRATE ET AL., supra note 89, at 343-88.
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elimination of the agency costs associated with the elimination of mi-
nority shareholders. The gain associated with the creation of control,
however, is largely absent.
In both situations, the gains from the aggregation of the shares
and the gains from the elimination of the minority shareholders are
created by the transaction and thus belong to the controller.'" There is
no difference here. In the latter case, however, where the only gain is
the elimination of the minority shareholders, the court will need to be
particularly cognizant of possible gains associated with the diversion of
corporate value to the controller. The difference becomes visible in
cases where an existing controller squeezes out minority shareholders
because there is a greater possibility that the gains represent a diversion
of a corporate opportunity.
Take the likely example where the evidence indicates that the firm,
with the minority squeezed out, will be better managed for reasons that
can arise from any number of factors. To whom does such a gain be-
long? In our categorization, the answer is that this gain must be shared
with the minority shareholders. Because there was no change in con-
trol, the existing controller could have made the changes that would
have resulted in improved management without squeezing out the mi-
nority. The only effect of the squeeze-out is that the controller no
longer has to share the gains with the minority shareholders, unless the
gains are somehow incorporated into determining the fair value of the
minority shares.
In sum, whether the value of control is part of "fair value" belong-
ing to existing shareholders depends on whether control has already
been consolidated. As previously noted, however, the Delaware courts
have applied an implicit minority discount analysis based on the propo-
sition that all shareholders are inherently entitled to a proportionate
share of the value of control, even in firms in which control has not
been aggregated. 172
 We disagree with that proposition as a general mat-
ter. It might be argued, however, that the proposition follows from the
Delaware Supreme Court's analysis in 1994 in Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., where the court stated:
171
 We do not disregard the possibility that introduction of a controller could impair
the value of minority shares, due to actual or threatened misappropriation. We do not ex-
pect, however, that controllers will ordinarily impair the value of the firm in which they
own a controlling interest.
172 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privi-
lege of exerting the powers of majority ownership come at a
price. That price is usually a control premium which recog-
nizes not only the value of a control block of shares, but also
compensates the minority stockholders for their resulting loss
of voting power.'"
The court's statement could be read to imply that the collective voting
power of even disaggregated shareholders must always be compensated
for when control is acquired. 174
We submit, however, that QVC itself does not compel this implica-
tion, at least as far as the concept of fair value is concerned.'" Quite
simply, the focus of the QVC opinion was not on fair value—i.e., the
shareholders' proportional share of the value of the existing corpora-
tion—but on the value that could be achieved by directors charged with
the fiduciary duty "to seek the transaction offering the best value rea-
sonably available to the stockholders." 176 That "best value" will include
whatever share of merger gains, including synergies, the company's di-
rectors are able to extract from the buyer through negotiation or a
competitive bidding process, or both. "Best value" and "fair value" are
not the same thing. Whatever QVC may require of directors selling the
company, it does not require that fair value include a share of enter-
prise value that would not exist but for the transaction that creates a
controlling share position." 7
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL SHARE VALUATION 11NT
COMPULSORY BUYOUTS
A. Redefining Valuation Methodologies to Fit the Type of Merger Involved
In our view, the foregoing analysis of agency costs and the benefits
of control has important normative consequences in the discussion of
appropriate share valuation standards in compulsory share buyouts. We
review those consequences by reference to three different situations:
(1) the acquisition of corporate control by a third party in an entirely
arm's length transaction, (2) the acquisition of control in a manage-
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ment buyout, and (3) the squeeze out of minority shareholders by an
existing controller.
1. Valuation in the Absence of a Controlling Shareholder
We begin with the case of dissenting shareholders who are being
squeezed out by a third-party buyer acquiring their company. hi light of
our analysis, the firm's going concern value can be estimated in this
case as the actual purchase price minus synergies minus control value.
Control value, as well as synergies, must be subtracted from the pur-
Chase price. Otherwise, failure to make this subtraction would result in
the minority/dissenting shareholders receiving a share of the value of
corporate control, the benefits of which are not reflected in the value
of the existing firm with disaggregated shareholders. Thus, a DCF
analysis would not reflect returns associated with the existence of a con-
trolling shareholder. Likewise, an appropriate measure of going con-
cern value in a comparable company analysis should not involve any
adjustment that would confer control value on the dissenting share-
holders. Therefore, the implicit minority discount concept, discussed in
both our earlier paper and in this Article, is out of place and incorrect.
We note that in a true third-party purchase situation, in which the
target company's board of directors and shareholders are disinterested,
there is no material concern that value is being misappropriated from
the dissenting minority. First, an acquisition of control by a third party
can only be completed upon approval by the target's board of direc-
tors, 178 acting subject to generally applicable. fiduciary duties, and by a
vote of shareholders.179 Second, in a sale for cash, the directors will be
subject to Revlon duties, under which commitments that hinder subse-
178 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251(b) ("The board of directors of each corpora-
tion which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agree-
ment of merger or consolidation and declaring its advisability."); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT,
§ 11.04(a) ("The plan of merger or share exchange must be adopted by the board of di-
rectors."); el id. § 11.04(6) (A board may submit a plan of merger to a shareholder vote if
it determines "that because of conflicts of interest or other special circumstances it should
not make such a recommendation ....").
179
	 e.g., DEL CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251(c) (requiring stockholder approval for a
merger agreement); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, § 11.04(e) (same); id. § 8.30(a) ("Each mem-
ber of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in
good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) ("In the spe-
cific context of a proposed merger of domestic corporations, a director has a duty under
title 8, section 251(b) of the Delaware.Code, along with his fellow directors, to act in an
informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of
merger before submitting the proposal to the stockholders?).
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quent superior bids are subjected to significant judicial` scrutiny. 18°
Thus, the market for corporate control, aided by a disclosure regime in
which information about pending takeover bids is widely and promptly
disseminated, provides significant assurance that target company share-
holders are treated fairly.isi
On the other hand, application of an upward adjustment to a
comparable company analysis for a perceived implicit minority dis-
count, while conceptually and normatively inappropriate, is unlikely to
have significant impact in the third-party purchase situation, as a prac-
tical matter. Ordinarily, it should be expected that the target board of
directors, bargaining at arms-length, will bargain for a share of both the
benefits of control and synergies. The resulting purchase price is thus
likely to exceed going concern value. Hence, there is little incentive for
180 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) ("The directors' role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the com-
pany."); see also Mills Acquisition Corp. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989)
("[Eyer') under the relatively broad parameters of the business judgment rule, ... the
relevant inquiry must focus upon the 'fairness' of the auction process in light of promot-
ing the maximum shareholder value as mandated by this Court in Revlon."). The court in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. explained:
[Higher] scrutiny is mandated by: (a) the threatened diminution of the cur-
rent stockholders' voting power; (b) the fact that an asset belonging to public
stockholders (a control premium) is being sold and may never be available
again; and (c) the traditional concern of Delaware courts for actions which
impair or impede stockholder voting rights.
637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). We recognize that because of infirmities in the voting process,
it is not impossible that shareholders could formally approve a merger that is contrary to
their collective interests. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 396, 355 (Del.
Ch. 2008) (seeking appraisal remedy where highly positive news emerged after board ap-
proval of merger agreement, but before the shareholder vote, yet shareholders narrowly
approved the merger). See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying:
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006); Marcel. Ka-
han & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO U. 1227 (2008).
181 The periodic disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act, together with
the other elements that tend to create relatively efficient markets for the securities of regis-
tered issuers, promote broad dissemination of information about pending merger propos-
als. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 599 (1984); Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate
Policy and the Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (2003). As a general
matter, such dissemination can be expected to elicit competing, superior bids for a com-
pany in the event that the terms of a proposed merger significantly undervalue the target
company. See generally In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch.
2007); In re Ft. Howard Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
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shareholders to seek an appraisal remedy because the court's award will
likely be below the original purchase price. 182
2. Valuation in Management Buyout Situations
The second situation we examine is where an existing manage-
ment group, not part of a controlling shareholder, participates in a
buyout by a third party. Despite the inclusion of management in this
scenario, our analysis is the same as in the third-party purchase in
which management does not participate. Here again, going concern
value should exclude not only synergies, if they exist, but should also
exclude any value resulting from the aggregation of shareS that creates
control. The reasoning is the same as in the prior case: including a
share of control, by use of an upward adjustment based on a perceived
implicit minority discount, inappropriately confers upon minority
shareholders value for control that they do not possess and that does
not exist until the acquisition is complete.
Here again, as a result of structural mechanisms that protect mi-
nority interests the potential for misappropriation of minority share-
holders is slight. In this situation, at least where the company's shares
are listed on a major stock exchange, there remains a majority of disin-
terested directors whose vote is necessary to approve the transaction. 183
The transaction must also be approved by shareholders, a majority of
which are disinterested, given the absence of a controlling shareholder.
Likewise, the directors' fiduciary obligations, including Revlon duties,
remain the sarne.' 84 To be sure, some of these protections may break
down in practice: a court may be rightfully suspicious that where the
CEO is a significant equity participant in the acquiring firm, even a
largely independent board of directors may not fully and effectively
pursue the highest available acquisition price.' Recent decisions in
lea See, e.g„ Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 59-64 (Del Ch.
2007) (using a fair value calculation of merger price minus synergies, therefore necessarily
finding an appraisal value lower than the merger price); Union 131. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v.
Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 343 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that when the sale
process is effective, the merger price minus synergies is the best evidence of fair value).
183 See, e.g., NYSE, 1Nc., Listed Company Manual 1303A.01 available at http://nyse
manuaLnyse.com/LCM/Sections  ("Listed companies must have a majority of independent
directors.").
184 See supra notes 179 and 180 and accompanying text.
115 See, e.g., In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 193-94 (classifying a CEO's 'virtually unlimited
access" to an independent board of directors' merger deliberations as inviting "suspicion"
and an indication that the "process [was] driven by management"); In re SS&C Techs., Inc.,
S'holders Ling., 911 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. Ch. 2006) (arguing that when negotiations have
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the Delaware courts, however, have deemed it sufficient protection in
such circumstances to leave the matter to the vote of disinterested
shareholders, as long as they are adequately informed about the back-
ground of the effort to sell the company.' 86
Yet here again, we are not too troubled by an award of fair value
that reflects an incorrect adjustment for an implicit minority discount,
as long as the merger involves synergies as well as a change in control.
As in the pure third-party purchase situation, the merger price (includ-
ing a bargained-for share of synergies and control value) will likely ex-
ceed going concern value. Consequently, any award that contains an
adjustment for a perceived implicit minority discount is still likely to be
below the deal price, which contains some sharing of the gains from
synergies as well as the gains from control. Again, dissenting sharehold-
ers would receive less than the deal price and would have no incentive
to pursue valuation litigation.
If the case does not involve synergies, however, an IMD-related
upward adjustment creates a potential for mischief in the form of un-
necessary and inefficient litigation. Although the board is likely to ne-
gotiate a buyout price that shares the control value, it is unlikely to se-
cure one hundred percent of that value. In this case, a minority
shareholder would have an incentive to seek appraisal in order to ob-
tain a fair value reflecting the full value of control—despite the fact that
the enterprise has had no controlling shareholder, and its value as a
going concern would not reflect the benefits of such control. Appraisal
litigation would therefore discourage value-creating transactions that
create control by aggregating shares. In such a management-buyout
situation the courts should avoid automatically resorting to an upward
already been tainted by an unreliable negotiator, a committee of disinterested directors
may be unable to correct for that negotiator's preemptive activities); Gholl v. eMachines,
Inc., No. 19444-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171 at *64-65 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (explain-
ing that members of the board may have ulterior motives in approving a low merger price,
such as "creating a liquidity event for themselves"); Mills Acquisition. 559 A.2d at 1268-69
(finding that when interested directors choose the members of a supposedly independent
"special committee" that essentially acts as a figurehead for those interested directors, the
special committee is neither independent nor neutral).
"8 In re Neuman, 924 A.2d at 207 (trusting that once shareholders are properly in-
formed about both the proposed merger and the company's financial state, they will make
"important voting and remedial decisions based on their own economic self-interest"); La.
Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1192 (Del. Ch. 2007) (find-
ing that despite "serious questions remain [ing] regarding the process surrounding the
merger negotiations, [the] Court places great trust in the decisions of informed, disinter-
ested shareholders"); Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co. (in re Topps Co. S'holders Litig.), 926
A.2d 58, 92-93 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a merger vote by shareholders until the board
of directors apprised shareholders of a potentially advantageous offer by a new buyer).
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adjustment for an incorrectly perceived implicit minority discount
when performing a comparable company analysis.
3. Valuation in Controller Squeeze-Out Mergers
In contrast, in the third situation—where an already existing con-
troller is squeezing out the minority shareholders—an upward adjust-
ment of the sort the courts use when invoking the IMD may actually
help reach an appropriate award, although still for the wrong reason.
We note again that when the respondent and the dissenters litigate the
case using the DCF method, the issue of the implicit minority discount
does not arise and hence our normative position would be the same as
the outcome that the court reaches. The question becomes: how
should the court handle the situation where the parties use a compara-
ble company analysis exclusively or in addition to their DCF analysis?
Based on our analysis, we treat this situation very differently from
cases in which the transaction is creating control where none existed
before. The prior existence of a controller obviously means that the
transaction at issue does not involve a change in control. Hence, most
of the control value—the amount related to the separation of owner-
ship and control—is already built into the value of the corporation
prior to the transaction and reflected in any analysis of its future cash
flows.
Consequently—and contrary to the prior fact patterns—the value
of control is already an element of going concern value. That is, the
value of the firm, to which the minority is entitled to a proportionate
share, incorporates the value associated with control. Although the
squeeze-out may still reduce agency costs—costs associated with dealing
with minority shareholders—this amount should ordinarily be relatively
small.
From a policy perspective, controller squeeze-outs of minority
shareholders raise several concerns. First, this is precisely the type of
case where the minority shareholder is most vulnerable in terms of the
available legal remedies. 187
 Second, assuming there are no synergies
181
 Where a controlling shareholder is acquiring the shares of the minority there is no
inherent protection afforded by the general requirement of director and shareholder
approval, since those formal requirements can be satisfied by the controlling shareholder's
own exercise of its power to elect directors and cast the necessary shareholder vote in favor
of the transaction. Moreover, given the controller's ability to veto any sale of the company
that it does not support, the directors have no Revlon duties to obtain the highest available
sale price. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) ("When [an] entire sale to
a third-party is proposed, negotiated and timed by a majority shareholder ... the board
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that might occur if the controller is able to merge the company with
another one that it already controls, the gains from the squeeze-out
transaction are limited to those associated with eliminating the minor-
ity shareholders. 188 Unless the controller discloses good reasons for rid-
ding itself of the minority shareholders, 189 the court can be rightfully
suspicious that the transaction makes sense only because of the diver-
sion of corporate opportunities, such as an impending sale to a third
party for a large premium over the company's going concern value.
Within this category of troublesome cases, the most troublesome
case occurs where the controller bases its valuation solely on a compa-
rable company analysis and not on a discounted cash flow analysis. In
most appraisal cases, the dissenters use the respondent's information as
a starting point for their own analysis. This is to be expected since it is
the respondent who has all the information advantages. It is the re-
spondent who knows whythe transaction is profitable to it, and it is the
respondent who has had continuing access to the company's planning.
Where the respondent uses the discounted cash flow analysis and
presents it in valuation litigation, it is reducing the information asym-
metries. In the standard DCF-based case, the valuation report will con-
tain the respondent's own projections of profitability and investment
opportunities over the next several years that were developed prior to
the proposed squeeze-out transaction. Although the respondent's ex-
pert may decide to use her own assumptions with respect to profitability
over the next several years, the disclosure of the controller's own pro-
cannot realistically seek any alternative because the majority shareholder has the right to
vote its shares in favor of the third-party transaction it proposed for the board's considera-
tion"); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.. 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) (rejecting the impo-
sition of an "affirmative duty on majority shareholders to auction the corporation when
seeking to cash-out the minority" and reaffirming that Revlon duties are only applicable
when the company is up for sale and it is unlikely that competing bidders will emerge in a
market check). On the other hand, enforcement of the fiduciary duty of loyalty may be a
significant check on controller misappropriation in squeeze-outs, and there is at least some
evidence that existing legal rules sufficiently protect minority shareholders. See Thomas W.
Bates et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects and Bid Negotiation in Freeze-Out Deals: Are Minority
Shareholders Left Out in the Cold?, 811 FIN. ECON. 681, 681 (2006) (concluding that "minor-
ity claimants and their agents exercise significant bargaining power during freeze-out pro-
posals").
186 We would expect that such gains would ordinarily be limited to elimination of the
costs of shareholder communications and other matters associated with registration under
the federal securities laws.
189 Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., No. 18462, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *5-6 (Del.
Ch. May 18, 2004) (acting as a case in which there was a strong and openly disclosed value-
creation justification for squeezing out the minority shareholders: specifically, the conver-
sion of the company from a subchapter C corporation to a subchapter S corporation).
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jections is critical in narrowing the information asymmetry gap. The
same is true when the respondent's expert proposes and provides a ra-
tionale for using a particular growth rate in calculating the terminal
value and a discount rate for discounting future free cash flows. Al-
though the choices of the growth rate and the discount rate are made
by the expert, they are made after discussions with the insider and are
thus informed by the insider's thinking.
The petitioner's expert thus has considerable information to use as
a starting point for her own projections. In the adversarial appraisal en-
vironment, the petitioner's projections are likely to be based on a more
optimistic view of the respondent's information. The respondent's in-
formation provides the anchor, allowing the petitioner's expert to float a
lower discount rate and a higher growth rate, or to otherwise challenge
assumptions or judgments built into the respondent's model)"
Suppose, however, that the respondent's expert only uses a com-
parable company analysis. Suppose further that the respondent has not
developed cash flow projections that contain any independent badge of
accuracy (for example, for use in capital budgeting decisions), and as a
result, the court is compelled to rely solely on a comparable company
approach to determine fair value. Comparable company analysis ordi-
narily reveals and relies on historical measures of firm performance,
such as past earnings or cash flow) 91 The controller's projections and
plans for the future of the firm are thus now essentially hidden from
the minority shareholders. In these circumstances, the dissenting
shareholders obtain almost no information on the company's longer-
term prospects, with the result that the information asymmetry is as
wide as possible.
How should the court handle a valuation measure that relies on
only a few data points with all of them in the past? One possibility is
that the controller is also ignorant of the future and is buying the com-
pany without any reliable projections as to whether the corporation's
prospects support the offered price. This is certainly possible. Another
possibility is that the controller has some estimates of future cash flows
but prefers to keep them hidden because they suggest higher future
cash flows than the historical data would suggest. We believe the latter
case is more likely, and accordingly we submit that the courts can ap-
19° See, e.g., Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 314 (Del. Ch.
2006) (describing how shareholder plaintiff's expert adopted different premises than
those in the DCF analysis submitted by the company's expert).
191 See Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP, L. 37,
116-19 (1997) (describing the elements of comparable company analysis).
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propriately draw a negative inference from the controller's sole reli-
ance on historical data—namely, that the use of that data would under-
estimate the fair value of the corporation.' 92
We emphasize that such an inference is entirely consistent with the
common law approach to this situation, where: (i) the party in posses-
sion of the best information who fails to produce it should suffer an
adverse inference from that failure,'" and (ii) the fiduciary who brings
about a transaction, from which it benefits at the potential expense of
the minority, must establish the fairness of the transaction.'"
Therefore our proposed solution in this situation is to create the
rebuttable presumption that hypothetical third-party sale value, meas-
ured by deal-price ratios in acquisitions of comparable companies, mi-
nus estimated synergies associated with those comparable company ac-
quisitions, serves as a better proxy for the firm's going concern value.
Based on our analysis of agency costs and the benefits of control, this
suggested presumption is quite reasonable because it would roughly
yield a valuation premised upon a pro rata sharing of the benefits of
control, while not conferring synergistic values on minority sharehold-
ers.
In fact, this is precisely the approach taken by the courts when they
apply an IMD adjustment to the result of comparable company analy-
sis. 195 Our approach, however, does not rely on a non-existent IMD as-
sociated with shares of publicly traded firms. Instead, we rely on the
proposition that where the controller is squeezing out the minority; the
firm should be valued on a basis that presumes that the value of control
is already an element in going concern value.
In our proposed approach, a controlling shareholder/respondent
would rebut the presumptive valuation technique by presenting a relia-
bly based DCF analysis to be evaluated by the minority shareholders
and the court. We believe that most controllers are capable of generat-
ing a DCF analysis and would thus have minimal concern over the ap-
plication of the presumption we advocate. Moreover, and perhaps sup-
192 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); ree also supra note 187
and accompanying text. Note that we are not asserting that the price/earnings or similar
ratios observed in comparable companies are systematically inaccurate or inapplicable to
the controlled company.
195 Witt Garkorn, 488 A.2d at 878 ("[Tlhe production of weak evidence when strong is,
or should have been, available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have
been adverse?), siting interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939).
194 E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994); Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 710; Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952).
195 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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plementally, the controller could adduce evidence that the elimination
of minority shareholders created significant additional value not al-
ready achieved by virtue of the pre-existing control) 96
Critics have been suggested that this approach does not sufficiently
address the case of a controller who achieves control through open
market transactions and thereafter uses the firm to obtain private bene-
fits at the expense of the minority before squeezing them out. 197 We
believe that these concerns have been adequately addressed already.
First, the minority shareholders have the duty of loyalty remedy avail-
able to prohibit such diversion) 98 Second, as we pointed out in our ear-
lier article, the definition of fair value is flexible enough to incorporate
a proportionate share of going concern value improperly diverted by a
con troller)"
B. Most Implicit Minority Discount Cases Reach an Appropriate Result
Judged under the foregoing analysis, many—if not all—of the
Delaware valuation cases that have relied on the IMD easily can be
viewed as having reached an appropriate valuation result, albeit on the
basis of the financially untenable "implicit minority discount."2" We
review some of these cases below, to further reinforce the appropriate-
ness of the preceding suggested approach to resolving valuation dis-
putes in squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders.
Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Intl., decided by the Delaware
Court of Chancery in 1999, nicely illustrates this point.201 In that case
the controlling shareholder effected a short-form merger, cashing out
the minority shares at $0.02 per share. 402 Both sides' experts relied
solely on comparable company market price ratio analysis. 203 Appar-
ently, because the company's operating history was quite short, neither
the respondent nor the petitioner presented any DCF analysis, despite
the suggestion that the company was hopeful that its operations could
become profitable with an infusion of capital. 204 The fair value estab-
' See Ng. 2004 Del. Ch. LEX1S 69, at *5-6.
197 See Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796,799-800 (Del. 1992).
198 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-14.
199 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, at 159-60 (describing Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989), which approved the inclusion of the value of a previ-
ously usurped corporate opportunity for purposes of determining fair value).
2°° See infra notes 201-225 and accompanying text.
2° 1 753 A.2d 451 (Del. Ch. 1999).
2" See id. at 454.
203 See id. at 455.
409 See id. at 453,455 n.5.
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lished by the court ($0.6253/share) exceeded the merger price by a
factor of over thirty. 2°6
 The court arrived at that result by deriving a
value based on comparable company share trading price ratios, adding
a thirty percent control premium, calculated by deriving an estimated
premium observable in comparable company acquisitions, and sub-
tracting ten percent "to reflect the elimination of impermissible ele-
men is of post-merger value. "2°6
We approve the method of valuation used in Borruso, in light of the
analysis outlined in the preceding subsection. 207
 No reliable DCF analy-
sis was presented that would have permitted the petitioners to effec-
tively test estimates of the present value of the company's future re-
turns.208
 Therefore, as the court observed, there was no meaningful
choice but to rely on comparable company market price ratio analy-
sis.209
 And by its "elimination of impermissible elements of post-merger
value," the court was properly attempting to exclude value attributable
to synergies that might be reflected in comparable company acquisition
prices. 210 •
What remained after that subtraction was a value that included the
value of control—which, in the situation presented in that case, should
have been fully or at least largely reflected in the going concern value
of the company being valued. 2" Stated this way, the court's analysis and
the result it reached were entirely proper. 212 The court was appropri-
ately protecting against controller opportunism in the situation—a
short-form squeeze-out merger—in which the minority shareholders
are most vulnerable. 2 " To reach its appropriate fair value result, on the
other hand, the court had no need to insist that "minority trading val-
ues . [are] not fully reflective of the intrinsic worth of the corpora-
don on a going concern basis	 • "214
2°5 See id. at 462.
2°6 See id. at 459.
207 See Borruso, 753 A.2d at 459.
2°8 See id. at 455, n.5.
"G See id. at 455.
21°
	 id. at 459.
211 see
212 Sec id.
213 See Borruso, 753 A.2d at 459.
214 Id. at 958. Other cases in which the courts have relied on the IMD appear to fit the
model suggested in Borruso. See, e.g., Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., No.
19211, 2004 Del, Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2009); Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs.
of Am. Inc., No. 12207-NC, 2004 Del Ch. LEXLS 108, at *129 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004); M.G.
Bancorp. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999); Kletnwort Benson Ltd. v. Sagan Corp.,
No. 1107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995); Hodas v. Spectrum
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We similarly support the approach applied by the Vice Chancellor
in DO & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc, decided in 2004 by the Delaware
Court of Chancery. 215 As we pointed out in our prior article, the court
could have relied on the petitioner's DCF analysis to justify, on a more
analytically sound basis, the result reached through application of the
imam We
 now take our approval of this approach one step further
•and offer a non-IMD based justification for the valuation approach ac-
tually adopted by the court. Invoking the IMD, the court in Travelocity
adjusted the result of a comparable company share price ratio valuation
upward by thirty percent—considerably below the estimated fifty per-
cent premium over market price reflected in acquisitions of control of
comparable companies. 217 Although the court was not explicit on this
point, such a middling approach is certainly consistent with an ap-
proach that explicitly starts with estimated third-party sale value and
subtracts some estimate of synergy contributions. 218 And we suggest that
such an approach is a reasonable way to determine fair value in the
case of a control shareholder squeeze-out where no reliable DCF analy-
sis is available. This is because the going concern value of the firm,
which the minority shareholders share proportionately, reflects the
benefits of control. With this view, there is no need to assert that the
comparable companies' share prices significantly understate the going
concern value of those companies.
One more example illustrates the operation of the approach we
suggest. In Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide Inc., a 2005 short-form squeeze-
out merger case, Vice Chancellor Strine relied significantly on a DCF
analysis based on what he described as "responsible management pro-
jections:119 In fact, the petitioners—consistent with the approach ad-
vocated by this Article—had opposed using any approach other than
the DCF analysis. 220 Nevertheless, the Vice Chancellor also chose to give
Tech., Inc., No. 11265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992). In all these
cases, a controlling shareholder was freezing out the minority shareholders. While a DCF
analysis was presented in some of these cases, and the use of third-party sale value minus
estimated synergies might therefore not have been presumptively correct in our view, that
valuation approach was at least a reasonable measure of fair value. In none of these cases,
however, was it necessary to have relied upon the core IMD assertion that enterprise values
inherently exceed trading Market prices.
212 See No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *46-48 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004).
216 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 19, at 59.
2" Daft, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXLS 75, at *46-48.
219 See id.
219
 Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., No. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *78
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
226 Sec id. at *63.
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some weight (one-fourth, to be precise) to a comparable company
analysis based on market price ratios of publicly traded comparable
companies. 221 He then made an upward IMD adjustment to that re-
sult.222
This upward adjustment—based on acquisition premiums minus
some amount attributable to estimated synergies—was entirely appro-
priate in the circumstances of that case. 225 It allowed the court to arrive
at a going concern value that reflected the fact of a pre-existing control-
ling shareholder. 224 Interestingly, the result yielded by the IMD-adjusted
comparable company analysis that the court used was fairly close to the
result of the DCF analysis—$34.99 per share, compared to the $32.08
per share DCF result. This observation further corroborates our view
that in a firm with a controlling shareholder, an estimate of third-party
sale value minus estimated synergies should be a reasonable proxy for a
DCF-oriented measure of going concern value. 225
For the reasons reviewed in the preceding subsection, however, we
maintain that this valuation approach ought to be limited to situations
where there is an existing controlling shareholder and where no rea-
sonably reliable DCF valuation is available. Thus, we would agree with
the Delaware courts' initial rejection of an IMD adjustment. As we
pointed out in our prior article, that rejection occurred in a case involv-
ing an acquisition by a third party of a company with no controlling
shareholder. 226 The shareholders in that case did not share in the bene-
fit of reduced agency costs since it was the acquirer who created that
benefit. In such situations, it would have been normatively incorrect to
insist that fair value be determined by reference to values that include
control—values that necessarily arise, even when estimated synergies
are subtracted, when fair value is measured by comparable company
acquisitions. In these cases, the correct approach to using comparable
company analysis is to rely on share trading price ratios, with no up-
ward adjustment at all. Thus, it is the ownership configuration of the
company being valued, rather than any putative discount associated
with comparable company share prices, that should determine the
preferable approach to comparable company analysis.
221 See id. at *78.
222 See id. at *69-70.
223 Sce id.
224 See id.
225 Andaloro, 2005 Del. Ch. LEX1S 125, at *62, *77.
226 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 19, at 17.
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CONCLUSION: OUR NORMATIVE CLAIMS SUMMARIZED
The case law rule that awards dissenting shareholders in an ap-
praisal case the pro rata going concern value of the enterprise is nor-
matively sound. Dissenting shareholders should be given the value of
what has been taken from them. If the merger is not approved, the
shareholders who continue to hold the shares receive a stream of ex-
pected dividends and capital appreciation. If the merger is approved
and dissenting shareholders perfect their appraisal rights, then the dis-
senting shareholders are paid an amount which is equal to the dis-
counted value of those expected dividends and capital appreciation of
their shares.
Conversely, acquirers who initiate transactions that create gains by
means of synergies or aggregation of shares to create control are al-
lowed to retain those newly created benefits themselves. This is the out-
come if the going concern value standard is applied. From a normative
perspective, the award has the advantage that it makes the merger,
which gives rise to appraisal, a Pareto superior transaction: the value-
creating acquirer benefits and the dissenting shareholders are no worse
off.
The use of the going concern value standard, appropriately de-
termined, effectively implements that Pareto superiority. Critical to our
normative claim is that the going concern value standard be deter-
mined so as to award dissenting shareholders not only the present dis-
counted value of the assets currently owned by the corporation, but
also the present value" of the reinvestment opportunities anticipated by
the firm at the time of the merger. The courts appear to have accepted
this proposition. 227
Cases where an already existing controller seeks to take the firm
private, however, are a cause for concern. As we emphasize above, most
of the premium associated with control shares is due to the ability of
the controller to direct the strategy of the firm, including the ability of
the controller to appoint or change management, determine compen-
sation, set operational and strategic policy, and change the course of
the business, Where a controller already exists, the benefits of control
are already reflected in the anticipated cash flows of the firm and there-
"7
 Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 313 (Del. Ch. 2006) (cit-
ing Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 6, and holding that if the concept of opening
[new MRI centers) was part of the business plans of Delaware Radiology as of the merger
date, then the value of those expansion plans must be taken into account in valuing Dela-
ware Radiology as a going concern ... ").
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fore belong to the minority shareholders pro rata. The potential right-
ful gains to the controller are thus limited to those specifically associ-
ated with a firm where the minority shareholders have been squeezed
out.
Consequently, any going-private transaction forced on minority
shareholders by a controller has to be closely inspected by the court to
ensure that the controller's gains from the transaction are not largely
diversionary in character. The stress on reinvestment opportunities
should correctly identify these gains and capture them for the benefit
of minority shareholders. Where DCF analysis is performed, the re-
spondent's detailed valuation projections are available to the petitioner.
Thus, the petitioner can append its own projections of reinvestment
opportunities directly into its own DCF analysis.
A problem arises, however, where the controller fails to present a
valid DCF analysis and relies instead solely on a comparable company
analysis that is based solely on historical data. This is problematic be-
cause minority shareholders and the court have no access to projec-
tions of future free cash flows of the firm. As noted above, this may be
due to the controllers' ignorance about the businesses' future prospects
or because the controller prefers to keep that information hidden.
In this Article, we propose a remedy for this situation. Specifically,
we advocate a penalty default in the form of a rebuttable presumption
that fair value includes the value of control as reflected in comparable
company acquisitions. That presumption is consistent with long-
standing common law rules, including the doctrine that requires con-
trolling fiduciaries to establish the fairness of transactions in which they
potentially benefit at the expense of the minority.
This rule creates incentives for the controller to present a DCF
analysis. The controller, as faithful fiduciary, can avoid the proposed
presumption by preparing and submitting a valid DCF analysis to judi-
cial and shareholder scrutiny. The opportunistic controller, on the
other hand, is subjected to a fair value determination that amounts to
third-party sale value minus synergies.
